What Should Be Called Science?

What is, or should be, allowed to earn the moniker scientific? This is not only the fundamental question in the dispute between ID and evolution but it is one of the fundamental questions in a philosophy of science that would be used to decide the question.

Where do we find the division between science that lies outside of physical studies and set this against matters of theology and philosophy? There are, after all, sciences that do not comply with either physicalism (the constraint that only the physical is studied) or methodological naturalism (the constraint that only the physical can be studied). These would include topics like tachyon theory and string theory, topic that are by consensus "science" but at the same time

From what I can tell, it is a minority that understand the greater structure of what is called evolution. The common-knowledge aproach says that evolution is nothing more than the theory of common descent. To come to this conclusion is just as superfluous as saying that all religions are the same because the all talk about a deity. In the case of religion we know that there is a great deal of difference, and these are exclusive differences, between pantheism, polytheism, monotheism, and fatalism. That there is a common characteristic between them is quite immaterial to their overall divergent theory structures. All theologies are theory structures and all scientific theorys are also structures, systematized to draw particular conclusions. The various evolutionary theory structures have their common features yet vary significantly. This variation is adequate to describe each of them as exclusive models. There is not one model, one theory of evolution. In today's world there are three, and perhaps four, that account for the subject.

But if no more than one of them is true, doesn't that mean that creaiton is automatically allowed into the discussion? On the PhiSci (Philosophy of Science) side of the discussion, I don't think that when good science goes beyond these two constraints that it necessarily allows theology in general or creation in particular. But what does happen, and this seems patently obvious, is that any sound criticism of an evolutionary model (a designation that I did not see in Coyne's book) leaves the theory structure lacking the certainty that Coyne, in his recent book Why Evolution Is True, gets all excited about. His certainty is unwarranted. That does, at least, leave room for other models that can rightly apply the scientific findings and answer other questions.

One of the core construction problems involves the demand for naturalism, either methodological or metaphysical (because methodological demands metaphysical), within the theory structure itself. The difficulty here is the naturalism -- it is a presumption. It is not part of the evidence and it is not part of the process. Presuppositions must be kept in their place. When a scientist demans naturalism in either form he automatically exist any experiment or test and is immediately engaged in philosophy. Doing so necessarily begs the question and automatically invalidates the test. (That's not to say that the test might be valid, but that it cannot be valid if it includes the presuppostion.)

A presupposition differs signification from an assumption. Presuppositions can be thought of as driving ideas while assumptions actually guide the mechanics of the process. In the case of the evolutionary model the general assumption is naturalism and the leading assumption is common descent. An evolutionary model can be executed without naturalism but few have attempted such an endeavor.

There are those of us in the OEC community who see the age of the earth, and also the whole universe, as indeterminable. Some, as you may have read, like to set dates of 50KY or 125KY, but those almost certainly defy the fossil record. What is necessary for an alternative model is one that is consistent with scientific findings and at the same time avoids the unnecessary contradictions and confusions of the current evolutionary models.

Evolutionary Models? Is there more than one evolutionary model? There are at least three. There is first the classic Darwinist position that can be identified by uniformitarian graudalism. The second is a variation as promoted by Dawkins, an accelerated gradualism. Then there is the Punctuated Equilibrium of Gould, et. al. Each of these finds certain supporting evidence in both the lab and/or the fossil record. Yet the orthodoxy of each is intended to disprove its predecessor and create a new solution to questions that pop up, and not just from creationists. There is also a fourth, a synthetic system that attempts to blend the three as needed, depending on the evidence.

Some will say that these are simply mechanisms, that all somehow attempt to explain the assumption of common descent. The problem is that each of these mechanism defines a whole new solution, and that is a new model. In addition, these mechanisms are exclusive in their claims. They may bear in common the assumption of common descent, but differ significantly in these other respects. They are all evolution the same way that protestants and Roman Catholics, and Orthodox are all Christian. Yet they are all exclusive in the same way that sola gracie and sola fide separate protestants to an exclusive position, and the authority of the Roman bishop is exclusive from the Orthodox bishop. The three, in each respective case, are exclusive systems with a common assumption. None are the same even though they share common traits. Though most of Christedom rejects the principle, the evolutionary community seems to enjoy its own eccumenism, despite the exclusive differences.

Now we come to a crux, a crisis, a place for a decision. Actually a couple. How can exclusive positions be reconciled? In simple terms, they cannot. This is a reasonable challenge for the naturalist evolutionists. How can evolution demand naturalism without begging the question? It cannot, at least not and be considered valid as a theory structure. But evolutionists do, and modifying their theory accordingly also seems to be a reasonable challenge.

Objection 1: When I read Darwin and many others there is no mention of naturalism or of a Godless universe. How is that latter challenge valid?

Answer: Part of today's popular dialogue demands that evolution always be framed and discussed within the context of naturalism. There is a distinct and clear refusal to employ only physicalism. Jason Rosenhouse quotes Jerry Coyne:

I am a methodological naturalist, but I don't think that all supernatural claims defy scientific analysis. Moreover, I don't see that the methodological/philosophical distinction has a lot to do with the dissonance between faith and science. The real dissonance, as I have repeatedly emphasized, is between the scientific acceptance of only those claims adjudicated by empirical investigation, and the religious acceptance of “truth” claims that are discovered by revelation (or instruction by one's parents) and are unfalsifiable. These are two fundamentally different and incompatible ways of ascertaining “truth.” In fact, I don't see that religion has any way at all of ascertaining “truth,” since its claims cannot be falsified.

Objection 2: This looks like an attempt to simply be scientific and avoid mixing religion with science.

Answer: Coyne confused issues of theory structure. The call to reject some questions because they cannot be "falsified" is a specious objection. Falsification is a matter of methodology and structure which religious matters do not fit into. Of equal importance is that falsification does not apply to evolutionary theory for the same reason. Evolution is a structure, not a positivist RV formula structure.

Evolution cannot be falsified. We cannot prove it wrong like 1+1=3. The best that we can do is expose the fallacies of the theory structure and challenge, and then remove, the current level of certainty that it does not deserve.

The Dilemma of Modern Western Civilization

A selection from Can Christianity Save Civilization by Walter Marshall Horton, Oberlin College, 1940, Harper & Brothers Publishers, pp 151-153.

The Dilemma of Modern Western Civilization: Totalitarianism or Christianity

The mention of Communism should remind us that modern Western civilization, whose disintegrating and reconstructive influence upon primitive and oriental culture has been so strong, is itself no longer a unity. It would be a strange nemesis indeed if Western civilization, after doing so much to destroy and so much, also, to save the older ad simpler cultures of the East, should itself be destroyed by its own inner inconsistencies.

As we have already noted in the previous chapter, modern Western civilization started out with a great revolt against the medieval synthesis. Art, science, education, business, and politics all became independent of churchly control, and set out upon separate courses of their own, guided only by such slogans as “Art for Art’s Sake” and “Business is Business.” The final result of these successive declarations of independence, as seen in the urban life of industrialized countries, is a scene of bewildering, nerve-racking clamor and confusion. Looking upon Manchester and Liverpool, Pittsburgh and Chicago, Aristophanes would surely repeat with redoubled emphasis his judgment upon Athenian life in the age of the Sophists, “Whirl is King, having driven out Zeus”; for he would see before him a civilization without an animating center, a civilization with so feeble a grasp upon the total meaning of life that it is trying to move in several incompatible directions at once, like a man with locomotor ataxia. Such a civilization cannot any longer hope to sweep on round the world, and dominate mankind. It must pull itself together quickly, and rectify its course, or it will suffer shipwreck; and only such fragments of its wreckage as may float ashore after the disaster will then be included in the world civilization of the future.

One wonders about disintegration and how it might play out. American society maintains a tension that is largely unfelt in Europe today. We still have Christians, of various stripes, who seek this reunification of life beneath a spiritual umbrella. Though the mechanisms and ends may vary the principle remains the same.

This trend of liberalism garners a reaction from the general public and not just from academics. Many parents do not want their children taught an all-encompassing Darwinist view of life (not just as a matter of origins), and would prefer that their values be reinforced in schools instead of contramanded. But the secularist demands that the church, even its values and ethics, be kept out of public life.

There is no society without authority. In practical terms there is always government and police. But in ethical terms there is either religious ethics and morality or there is statism. Horton's position, even pre-WWII, and still in the early days of the USSR, pre-PROC, pre-Iron Curtain, must be understood more clearly. There is no ethical vacuum. Either religious ethics saves society or statism destroys it, as it did with PROC, USSR, Nazi Germany, and every other statist system. All of them fail, not only economically, but all of them fail ethically.

Without Christian ethics, Western government may live but Western civilization will die.

A Conflict of Qualities

Pam Chamberlain of On the Issues Magazine draws this conclusion on matters of ethics and morality:

In the midst of the attempts to negotiate, it is just too easy to forget the reasons we are in the fight in the first place. Women and LGBT people continue to be the targeted by those who wish for a past we never really had and are threatened by a future that we cannot control. Too often the Christian Right has mobilized this group to think and act in ways that obstruct civil and human rights. It's our responsibility to hold firm to our principles and not let anyone negotiate them away.

Apart from the fundamental religious bigotry expressed by reducing consensus to a sort of shallow an manipulated group think, Chamberlain draws upon the secular principles of "civil and human rights" to support her positions regarding abortion and the implied "gay rights" agenda. But what are these civil and human rights? Where did they come from? Who created them? Are they subject to any level of scrutiny?

Peter Fitzpatrick discusses the modern concept of secular rights, but in a somewhat theological framework. His goal is to clarify, through Nietzsche, that

the appropriation in such terms of the "human" of human rights is ultimately impossible, but to show also that this impossibility is productive of possibility.

:::

It is this exalted openness to possibility that suscitates the "human" of human rights. That openness, in turn, is carried by the "rights" of human rights – rights which, complicit as they may be in existent oppressions, can never be contained by these oppressions. It is in the rendering of this uncontainment that human rights become liberative.

and

The historical rupture usually taken as generating modern secularism with its rights of "man" looks itself, when closely observed, rather more like continuity. Burleigh’s irresistible account of religion and politics in the French Revolution reveals an intense reliance on substituted religious practices – reliance on, for example, massive religious festivals worshiping a plethora of "deified abstractions."

What are we to make of this? Shall we consider morality actually secular or shall we consider what is secular to be actually religious? It seems that what remains is, as Clouser identified as the substance of argument (The Myth of Religious Neutrality) and Gray identified in history (Black Mass, Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia), is that Christianity appears inescapable.

The core question is answered as to whether or not there is really anything secular. The only philosophical construct that even appears close to being secular is Rand's Objectivism, although even that system depends upon some sense of universal realities. There is nothing which is truly secular. What exists is a hijacking of Christian morality in a desperate attempt to escape the church and the demands of morality. It is venture in vanity.

If Chamberlain is asking for morality, what kind of morality is she asking for? She is asking for the right to take another life through abortion empowerment. She is asking for personal autonomy. She is asking for sexual licence. All these come without the constraint of moral agency, the authority of God and the Church in the life of the individual. Her substitute is the power of government and consensus to enforce rights. This is an Hegelian approach to morality. To use the secularist's term, this is "steeplejacking" the church in a vain attempt to secularize morality.

Chamberlain's compalint, as it stands, must fall on deaf ears. She demands a morality of rights but really asks for indulgence. It is an abuse of rights for the purpose of subverting the dominant paradigm.

Ritschlian Ethics and Modern Liberalism

Though a good number of modern liberals whom I’ve read make specific appeals to Schleiermacher for their sentiments about God and the nature of Christianity, few make any appeal to the origins of their ethical foundations. Though many positive statements are made regarding ethical behavior, yes, may even come from relativist liberals, the ethic is generally expressed without appeal to an identifiable origin.

The sentimental approach of Schleiermacher makes for a difficult foundation for ethics as sentiments shift so easily. What appears to be the case is that late 19th century theological liberalism may be closer to being their source for ethics than those of the early 19th century; specifically, Ritschl.

Ritschl resoundingly rejects Schleiermacher’s appeal to feeling but accepts many of this other fundamental tenets, including his view of religion as a social construct (Orr, 42-43). This “fellowship” or “community” is itself the “redemption” that is the Kingdom of God (Orr, 44-45). This is a view of religion, and specifically of Christianity, which is more than troubling to anyone who holds to any historic orthodoxy. Ritschl, like Schleiermacher, here removes from Christianity its uniqueness and unique relationship with God.

One might rightly call this a relative theology because the theology itself is not merely composed of relativistic components, but is itself subject to value comparison against other theologies (religions), and against an individual’s sense of reality. Even though Christianity might be found to have positive historical value (according to Ritschl) it is left without its ontological foundations. This sense of relativism reflects Ritschl’s dependence upon Kant in other areas.

Ritschl’s ethic is derived from a Kantian sense of greater good. It is almost purely Kantian, encouraging the individual toward making “value-judgments” (Orr, 43). This is, of course, a necessary approach, for Ritschl’s approach to the actual existence of God is, like De Wette, one of religious symbolism rather than objective existence (Orr, 46). This leaves Ritschl with a relativistic ethic that goes hand-in-hand with his relative theology.

As evangelicals we can provide a richer ethic than can the world of relativism. All you ethicists out there, take heart. We have something far better, far sounder, and far more consistent than relativism might ever provide.

Orr, James, The Ritschlian Theology and the Evangelical Faith, Second Edition, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1898

On Ethical Foundations

What Lies Beneath

“What is ethical for Joe may not be ethical for Jane.” See? Wasn’t that easy? Problem solved: Give people what they want and all is well with the world. After all, we can not tolerate Joe imposing his ethic on Jane. That would be wrong and might even violate the First Amendment.

Beneath these statements is a foundation, a reason why people think and act the way they do. These reasons come before the ethic and help to create the ethic. Most all of us would say that murder is wrong and the vast majority might cite the Ten Commandments “Thou shalt not kill” or some other religious foundation. In the West this is a Christian ethic.

There are cultures where it is not unethical to initiate the conditions to take another person’s life against their will. There are “honor killings” in some cultures. Until the 20th century, in India a widow would throw herself alive, or be thrown, onto the funeral pyre. In Europe there is a good deal of winked-at active euthanasia, just as in the U.S. there is an immeasurable quantity of infanticide. In these last two cases the tolerance of these actions has become the de facto ethic of the culture, even though it remains unstated.

Needless to say, there are easily hundreds, if not thousands, of foundations which can support and create an ethic. To this the relativist (the one who thinks that there are no absolutes) would say that because all of the foundations are of equal validity so too all of the ethics are of equal value. The position of the relativist, if true, leaves the world with no ethical guide, only culture. And in a tragic irony, a culture that sees itself as irrelevant will proceed to define itself out of existence. This is a sample of what is called nihilism.

(This is why the “religious right” and fundamentalist Christians are so gung-ho patriotic: It is because we understand this process very well. But unfortunately we have done a very, very poor job of communicating it outside of our own circles. We need more sound evangelicals teaching ethics in colleges these days.)

Swimming Upstream

American culture began as a Christian culture. The revivalism that spread across the land from the time of Wesley until Moody made fundamentalist Christian thought the de facto ethical basis for social policy. It’s not that the U.S. was designed in the Constitution or other founding documents to be a protestant, fundamentalist country. With the mention of Thomistic natural law in the Declaration of Independence (“Nature” and “Nature’s God”) we have, at minimum, a foundation for the nation’s founding, partly in Christian theology. It does not make this country in any way a theocracy but it does provide a foundation for saying that our Christian heritage defines our existence and the founders’ intentions.

Today’s secularists and liberals borrow their ethic from Christianity. Kant’s categorical imperative of moral obligation, Marx’ concern for the welfare of the worker, the Sojourners’ Covenant for a New America, and Barak Obama’s emphasis on social work all contain a hint of Christian theology, but are unfortunately bound together with other baggage.

Most of us would agree, and even work towards, maintaining a government that is neither ecclesiastical nor (immediately) theological. We do not want the government involved in church life, period. At the same time, no government can be free from addressing ethics. Ethics is what law is all about – a determination of what is right and wrong, about just rewards and punishments, about first principles and the Constitution, about both maintaining and progressing our society to take on the challenges of the future.

But with any ethic there comes the call for a foundation, and here is where the choice is made. What should we choose? Should we choose the pragmatic approach? Should we take a hedonistic approach? Should we take a theological approach? (And if theological, which one?)

The pragmatist would emphasize the workability of an ethic – what will it produce and what is its greatest benefit or loss. This type of thinking works for business, it works for pleasure, and it works for social engineering. Pragmatism, as a primary foundation, leaves behind the dignity of the individual, as well as a host of other matters.

The hedonist seeks whatever gives the greatest pleasure. To the hedonist a law which unnecessarily takes away or limits pleasure is a bad thing and should be rejected. This approach is often taken by those who would manipulate people’s desires, as with the gambling, alcohol, and abortion industries. They leave people with pain while promising pleasure.

In the case of the U.S., the presence of the Christian, and especially the protestant, ethical voice in the history of the nation is inescapable. It is not that the ethic was enshrined in law but rather that it was embedded within the culture. Whether Roman, Orthodox, Anglican, Lutheran, Reformed, Baptist, or otherwise, there were certain standards set in the public mindset. These are reflected in the ethics within the Constitution as well as in legislation and regulation. Bribery is wrong. Justice should be blind. And so much more.

Of Books and Cradles

I will assert two things here. The first is that the U.S. will not cease to exist as the Christian ethic is forsaken. The second is that the U.S. will cease to exist as it has in the past as the Christian ethic is forsaken.

Just as Rome went from a republic to a dictatorship, so also the U.S. will continue to move from a democratic, constitutional republic to become a centralized authoritarian state. The reason for this is the adoption of the Hegelian socialist paradigm (but not yet a completely socialist system) which places the government is a more and more powerful position of control over private enterprise. The forthcoming projected ownership, whether in whole or in part, of the auto manufacturing and health insurance industries, should serve as adequate evidence. I’m not saying that regulation and involvement are not a legitimate place for government, but that ownership is not, historically and constitutionally, where the energies of our system belong.

The U.S. will not cease to exist but will change, not incrementally, but catastrophically. These steps express both economically and legislatively the end of liberal democracy. That (in its current condition) it has ended is evident. That it knows that it has ended is another matter.

Our efforts are often focused on the particulars. Keeping that candidate out of office, or keeping that court under control, or keeping that legislation off the books, all of which are necessary efforts. These battleground matters happen because people are at work behind the scenes where the draft legislation, promote candidates, or appoint judges. That is where the first battle is fought.

I’m not suggesting the simple idea that it is a legitimate task for the Christian to establish or maintain liberal democracy. There are many aspects of the system which are antithetical to sound doctrine, and any partnership with it, or any governmental system, makes room for some costly compromises. What I propose instead is that we be involved in civic affairs for the best interests of all, and that we make those things even clearer in our publications and pronouncements. Additionally, this needs to be a regular portion of church curriculum, both for adults and for children.

Comprehensive solutions are critical. Take for instance, the efforts of the Religious Coalition for Reproductive Choice. Their material includes everything from sermons to ethical considerations for legislation. On the evangelical side, Focus on the Family has similar material. Education is the key, and participation in civic affairs is critical to being heard and helping.

Of Salt and Light

If the modern doctrine of relativism was held consistently there would be no battle for supremacy. But the doctrine is not what it appears, except as a false motivator that asks the competition (that’s us) to cease its efforts, to surrender. As the liberal efforts toward secularization continue there will be additional efforts to remove the historic Christian ethic from the broader society. Many of these efforts are easily identified, such as the complaint that a Christian ethic behind California’s Proposition 8 is somehow an endorsement of Christianity as a state religion, and as such a violation of the First Amendment.

Whether or not they competition succeeds should not be of primary importance to us as our ministry is first one of involvement in the redemptive gospel. What we have is an opportunity to be of value, to be salt and light – things that are desirable.

An important method to use for helping society correct its injustices is to show the inconsistency and flaws that the various other foundations produce. In addition, the expression of positive solutions to real problems will serve to maintain a Christian ethic in a valuable relationship with society.

Many have written about, and work in, the pro-life arena. There are efforts to save lives by doing the negative (stopping abortion, infanticide, and euthanasia) and the positive (making adoption more affordable, encouraging foster care, and directly participating in adoption process).

There are also some rhetorical concerns. Among these is the use of “fetus” in a sense that removes humanity from the unborn. The term “justice” is one that has been co-opted and given new meaning and directly affects the application of ethics to life. The response would be simple: If an ethic does not conform to the common perception of “justice” then it is, necessarily, “unjust” and subsequently should be rejected. To counter this we need to confront the rhetorical tools that redefine “justice” and make a suitable correction.

One of the characteristics that we find is the use of the term “social justice”, as does RCRC. One broad definition of the term is that it describes

the distribution of advantages and disadvantages within a society

That’s ok as far as it goes, but as you can see it lacks application. Ethics are always tainted by assumptions and presuppositions which lead to application. More on that later.

What RCRC has completely ignored is any ethical statement regarding those issues which create clear division. There is no mention of infanticide (a winked-at outcome of abortion practice), no mention of euthanasia against those who survive abortions, no mention of life after viability, and no mention of late-term, partial-birth abortions. RCRC does not confront its ethical shortcomings. Their method is not to improve or correct their specific position but merely to connect it to others so that it cannot be treated distinctly. That method is one of avoidance and mentioning it is adequate to show its inherent weakness.

Despite RCRC’s laudable efforts to help those in need, there is a certain naïve attitude that allows them to make statements like this:

"If more children in this country were born to parents who are ready and able to care for them,” says the National Campaign to Prevent Teen and Unplanned Pregnancy, “we would see a significant reduction in a host of social problems afflicting children in the United States, from school failure and crime to child abuse and neglect."

There is a good deal of evidence to support the failure of this aged Planned Parenthood slogan. In a manner consistent with the rhetoric, RCRC does not mention adoption in this essay.

What we face with RCRC, and those of similar affinity, is not an ethic that has adapted to science and culture, but one that has simply adopted new strategies to maintain its position.

Language Speaks

The difference between the pro-life and the pro-abortion communities is not that one overtly hates women and the other overtly hates the unborn. Both sides are convinced that, having the best possible positive motivations, they are attempting to accomplish what is best for society. The difference does not lie in their motivations, for the world is filled with motivations which ought be praised. The difference is the foundation for their ethic, and until this is confronted there will be no position change.

But too often we Christians are afraid to clarify our position as a Christian position, afraid to use Christ’s name. The alternative has been quite popular over the last several decades – public language. Public language is how we find ways to state the Christian ethic in secular terms. It represents, on its best side, the idea that these principles are universal (which makes many a Kantian smile with glee) and on its worst is a compromise of our association with Christ. We fear public rejection and reprisal.

One way to deal with the problem is through more thorough communication of what an ethic is. An ethic is not a requirement for membership in a denomination or other group, it is not a dogma that defines an ecclesiastical structure, and it is not a doctrinal position which decides orthodoxy. A Christian ethic is an application of Scripture to an area of life where a principle is derived, and which principle can be applied to life for practical benefit.

All ethics as such are tainted. The evangelical ethic is a largely exegetical ethic, founded primarily on material pulled from the Bible. Some will add to it both philosophy and developed theology such as Natural Law. In any case, though, the primary influence on the ethic is the Bible, and that makes it essentially Christian.

On the other side is the “progressive” ethic. The foundation for this is the liberal movement of the past three centuries and centers on the individual and personal rights. But not being any more homogenous than the Christian ethic, much of the modern progressive movement is tainted by the “social dialectic” of class warfare, which pits men against women and, unfortunately, women against their own offspring.

To confront the progressive ethic we would do well to ask the simplest of questions. One of these questions, at least in principle, came to the forefront during the recent presidential election. We would do well to iterate them specifically and clearly to the abortion community and to legislators:

Why would you turn women against their own children?
Why will you not defend those born alive?
Why should the government be actively involved in killing people?

Add more questions to the list. Confront the issues and the people involved. But let the chips fall where they may, because we do not own society. The best we can do is provide the value of salt and light, proclaim the gospel clearly, and proceed to do what good we can.

Regarding John Gray’s Black Mass, Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia

John Gray’s Black Mass, Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia is a combination of historical survey of our modern liberal political enterprise in light of Western Christian theological influences, a review of the current political situation in the West, and Mr. Gray’s principles for the future of politics.

Mr. Gray’s historical assessment of the influence of postmillennial and apocalyptic theology on whole range from radical Marxism to secular liberalism to Religious Right conservatism is useful reading for anyone interested in the philosophical origins of American thought. The liberalism that we all enjoy is quite Christian and very apocalyptic, seeking to provide the final, better world for human existence. His assessment is certainly not naïve:

Contemporary liberal thinkers tend to view the totalitarian movements of the last century as anomalies in western history, and there is a similar tendency among conservatives regarding the millenarian frenzies of the Middle Ages. These outbreaks of mass killings are seen as departures from the peaceful norms of a civilization that is good, healthy and harmonious. Not all the world’s evils come from “the West” – however that amorphous concept is defined. Humans are an extremely violent species; there are plenty of examples of mass killing in non-Western societies. Where the West is distinctive is in using force and terror to alter history and perfect humanity. The chiliastic passions that convulsed late medieval Europe and which reappeared in the twentieth century are not aberrations from a pristine western tradition. They go back all the way and they continue today. In the twentieth century they were embodied in secular regimes that aimed to remake humanity by force. (p. 35)

While I find this an excellent historical review, it does have some serious shortcomings. He ignores Hitler’s hatred of Christianity (p. 68) in arguing to make his point. He also treats Lenin’s rise to power as some sort of “accident” (p. 45), seemingly ignoring Lenin’s lengthy involvement in the revolutionary process.

When it comes to current events this work should definitely be taken with a grain of salt. His perspective on current issues, esp. the character of U.S. involvement in Iraq, reads like a partisan talking points paper instead of an objective analysis of the greater situation. (p. 100-104)

For Mr. Gray there is no consistent end. His case is not a simple one. He makes very clear the failure of our liberal world to accomplish its utopian goals, the mutual failure of nation-states to fully encompass the needs of the whole society, and the lack of freedom within totalitarian systems. But his solution does not yield a fruitful result. His appeal is a Randian reach to reason and science, and that is his sense of realism. What remains is the physical world; there is nothing transcendental. His realism is without ontology or teleology, reflecting his abandonment of any apocalyptic ends. This is a position of ultimate naturalism that ends with a high level of frightening consistency. By excluding anything metaphysical he excludes ethical considerations from the political process. In this he reads more like coherent Nietzsche.

The matter of ethics brings out a serious contradiction in Mr. Gray’s thoughts. One the one hand he sounds like the teleological Christians whom he criticizes when he promotes the best virtues of societies that help the needy and minorities. On the other hand, he sounds like just another despotic scientific atheist as he promotes a system driven by reason and science. The result is that Mr. Gray is not only unable to escape the enlightenment liberalism that he maintains has failed but he is also unable to escape the Christian character and ethic that clearly affects his position.

It is works such as this which present the greatest philosophic dangers to political and social systems. It is a system without an ethic but pretends to appeal to an ethic for the benefit of society. Such is the arbitrariness of proposed totalitarian solutions, and a fundamental motivation for the Christian, especially the evangelical, to pursue a place for the Christian ethic in civic life.

Without a view toward the future, without some sort of apocalypse or similar terminus, there is no possibility for progress. There is no political solution to the human condition.

Lenin’s Socialism and Revolution

A Review of Chapter 1 of What is To Be Done?

Lenin thought that violent revolution was not always necessary. Instead he proposed an incrementalism that would slowly establish socialism within a society.

Social-Democracy must change from a party of social revolution into a democratic party of social reforms. (p. 1)

Behind this is an outlook on human history that employs the Marxist historical framework. He anticipated

the possibility of putting socialism on a scientific basis and of demonstrating its necessity and inevitability from the point of view of the materialist conception of history. (p. 1)

For Lenin the material world is all there is and with that would come his presumedly necessary socialism.

When arguing against socialism we must be cautious to keep classic liberalism separate from the more recent Marxist variety. Lenin caught this error and used it to his advantage, noting that his critics would deny

the antithesis in principle between liberalism and socialism. (p. 2)

One significant difference between the two is that liberalism places a great deal of emphasis on the individual while the Marxist places the emphasis on society and community, on union and other group dynamics.

Another concern of Lenin was his critics’ rejection of

the theory of the class struggle, on the alleged grounds that it could not be applied to a strictly democratic society governed according to the will of the majority, etc. (p. 2)

In the US we call it “class warfare” where envy and jealousy are incited so as to both cause problems as well as to win votes. It is not there are no classes, and it is not that there is a level of abuse that comes with all class-based relationships. For Lenin this struggle is necessary to bring about the revolutions and reforms that he sought.

But what should an abused citizen expect out of the government once these reforms have been put in place? Lenin is quite clear.

If democracy, in essence, means the abolition of class domination, then why should not a socialist minister charm the whole bourgeois world by orations on class collaboration? Why should he not remain in the cabinet even after the shooting down of workers by gendarmes has exposed, for the hundredth and thousandth time, the real nature of the democratic collaboration of classes? Why should he not personally take part in greeting the tsar, for whom the French socialists now have no other name than hero of the gallows, knout, and exile (knouteur, pendeur et deportateur)? And the reward for this utter humiliation and self-degradation of socialism in the face of the whole world, for the corruption of the socialist consciousness of the working masses – the only basis that can guarantee our victory – the reward for this is pompous projects for miserable reforms, so miserable in fact that much more has been obtained from bourgeois governments!

He who does not deliberately close his eyes cannot fail to see that the new “critical” trend in socialism is nothing more nor less than a new variety of opportunism. And if we judge people, not by the glittering uniforms they don or by the high sounding appellations they give themselves, but by their actions and by what they actually advocate, it will be clear that “freedom of criticism” means’ freedom for an opportunist trend in Social-Democracy, freedom to convert Social-Democracy into a democratic party of reform, freedom to introduce bourgeois ideas and bourgeois elements into socialism. (p. 2-3, bold emphasis mine)

To be brief, his socialism is the opportunity for the masses to milk the system for all it is worth. It is an opportunity to bring socialism into a hybrid situation where the goals can be met at the expense of the opposition.

In this he accomplished two goals – he encouraged the opportunist use of the bourgeois system for the benefit and furthering of socialism while at the same time denouncing its attempts at criticism which could lead to a diminishing of his Marxist orthodoxy by “vulgarising Marxism,” as he called it. In this he was quite skilled, keeping his orthodoxy as pure as possible while taking full advantage of the competition.

This is more easily accomplished when a system of though, like Marxism, has an orthodoxy. Most national economic systems have no such characteristic and as such vulnerable, a fact with which Lenin was certainly familiar, and which provided him with this practical advantage.

Lenin’s demand for orthodoxy was not left at the level of assertion but took on a strategy.

The question now arises: such being the peculiar features of Russian ”criticism“ and Russian Bernsteinism, what should have been the task of those who sought to oppose opportunism in deeds and not merely in words? First, they should have made efforts to resume the theoretical work that had barely begun in the period of legal Marxism and that fell anew on the shoulders of the comrades working underground. Without such work the successful growth of the movement was impossible. Secondly, they should have actively combated the legal ”criticism“ that was perverting people’s minds on a considerable scale. Thirdly, they should have actively opposed confusion and vacillation in the practical movement, exposing and repudiating every conscious or unconscious attempt to degrade our programme and our tactics. (p. 9)

This strategy is nothing new or particular to the Marxist ideology. Even within our theology we write and attack heresy (“legal Marxism”) and ecumenism (to him “opportunism”), and develop an apologetic against “criticism.” What is significant is that this is a movement centered on him as a person (revealed later by way of the statue of him in Red Square), and as such it became a coordinated and managed affair.

In this I sometimes wonder if the socialism in the US is really so “grass roots” as the information media would claim, or if there is a good deal of coordination between think tanks that leads to behavior. There are instances where this is evident but times where it is not so clear. We might to well to expose those situations where the evidence is discernable.

Lenin also rejected the German attitude toward reality as an impediment to the advance of socialism.

In a word, the Germans stand for that which exists and reject changes; we demand a change of that which exists, and reject subservience thereto and reconciliation to it. (p. 11)

(I wonder if the Marxist socialist demand for change was involved in Hitler’s hatred for Communism. The demand to change is difficult for any society to accomplish rapidly.)

The use of education to promote his socialism creates a problem to which we do well to be aware.

Those who have the slightest acquaintance with the actual state of our movement cannot but see that the wide spread of Marxism was accompanied by a certain lowering of the theoretical level. Quite a number of people with very little, and even a total lack of theoretical training joined the movement because of its practical significance and its practical successes. … If you must unite, Marx wrote to the party leaders, then enter into agreements to satisfy the practical aims of the movement, but do not allow any bargaining over principles, do not make theoretical “concessions”. This was Marx’s idea, and yet there are people among us who seek-in his name to belittle the significance of theory! (p. 12, bold emphasis mine)

Lenin enjoyed the spreading of Marxist ideals through the broader society but at the same time decried it’s being watered down. Again he asks for orthodoxy in the theory. The problem this raises for our awareness is that we do well to confront the principles of socialism up front and minimize their impact and so protect society from those who teach the more orthodox Marxism in the universities and elsewhere.

Lenin insists that revolution is necessary, even if socialism comes into play in a society.

Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement. (p. 12)

His position is not one of mere political philosophy but of physical danger. While we see very few of them in the US, those of us who observed the “new Left” in the 1960s remember Armstrong, Bill Ayers, Jerry Rubin, and the other revolutionaries whose work continues, and whose names are now, somehow, cleared in the eyes of many because of the acceptance of Barak Obama. It is a sad statement on the state of our national conscience.

The emphasis on theory, not just revolution and social change, is of high importance to Lenin.

He who realises how enormously the modern working-class movement has grown and branched out will understand what a reserve of theoretical forces and political (as well as revolutionary) experience is required to carry out this task. (p. 13)

This places an important challenge to the conservative and classic liberal, and also on the evangelical and other orthodox Christian, to take the assertive position of attacking the socialist ideology directly, by replacing professors, by teaching more suitable principles, and by building policies and legislation to defeat this evil.

Again, going back to the situation in Germany and hinting again at a cause for Hitler’s disenchantment with Communism, quoting Engles:

The German workers have two important advantages over those of the rest of Europe. First, they belong to the most theoretical people of Europe … (p. 13)

It makes one wonder, not at all if Hitler were good for Germany, but why so many of those who opposed Hitler would accept the evils of socialism as an alternative? To substitute one grave error for another equally grave error seems to be the tragedy of human existence.

Russia’s abusive tsars were definitely earning a revolution and Lenin was certainly the voice behind this.

The Russian proletariat will have to undergo trials immeasurably graver; it will have to fight a monster compared with which an antisocialist law in a constitutional country seems but a dwarf. (p. 15)

But was he fighting the tsarist system or was he fighting a constitution? Perhaps both, but his statement rings clear that the constitution is not secondary but primary and equal to the tsar in his concerns. In the US our lightweight socialists use their theory against the literal constitution and change it to a figurative document and so find avenues to implement socialist policy. Such is the error of today’s Left.

One might conclude that the creeping socialism we see today, while certainly Marxist, might better be branded Leninist.